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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, regulators around the world have increased their
focus on investigating and prosecuting corporate corruption. Many
governments have recently adopted or enhanced their domestic anticorruption laws, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain,
Brazil, Canada, China, and Mexico. In March 2016, the French
government will consider the adoption of a new criminal statute
creating deferred prosecution agreements in France.1 In the United
* Daniel Schimmel is a partner in Foley Hoag’s International Litigation and Arbitration
Department, resident in New York. He leads the international arbitration and litigation practice
of the New York office. He has acted as counsel and arbitrator in matters involving
international corruption investigations.
** Anthony Mirenda is a partner in Foley Hoag’s White Collar Crime and Government
Investigations practice, representing corporations and their officers, directors and others in
criminal and regulatory investigations, in complex civil litigation, and in confidential internal
investigations.
*** Shrutih Tewarie is an associate in Foley Hoag’s Litigation Department. She
represents multinational corporate clients and foreign sovereign governments in a wide variety
of cross-border disputes. She also represents corporations and senior executives in US
government investigations, with a focus on investigations brought under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.
1. A deferred prosecution agreement is a mechanism to resolve a potential criminal
charge before it is asserted, with the prosecution agreeing to defer bringing the charge for a
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States, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have maintained anti-corruption
enforcement as a high priority, initiating scores of investigations and
obtaining hundreds of millions of dollars in penalties under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). Multiple public statements
made by DOJ and SEC officials have left no doubt that this emphasis
will continue in the future.2
Against this backdrop, corrupt payments by third-party
representatives such as agents, distributors, or consultants are one of
the largest and most uncertain risks to companies that are subject to
the FCPA or anti-corruption laws of other countries.3 When such
corrupt payments do occur, United States regulators have made clear
that a corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing
and its willingness to cooperate in an investigation are factors they
consider in deciding whether to commence, decline, or otherwise
resolve a FCPA matter.4 The DOJ and the SEC similarly consider the
extent to which the company has identified and disciplined the
individuals responsible for the corporation’s alleged malfeasance.5 As
period of time while the defendant agrees to satisfy certain conditions, typically including
compliance program enhancements, with the expectation that, assuming no further
misconduct, upon the successful completion of such enhancements, the prosecution would
forego bringing the charge altogether. See also Marie Bellan, Un Nouvel Arsenal de Lutte
Contre la Délinquance Financière, LES ECHOS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.lesechos.
fr/economie-france/budget-fiscalite/021673842508-loi-sapin-un-nouvel-arsenal-de-luttecontre-la-delinquance-financiere-1197812.php; Marie Bellan, Corruption Des Entreprises: Le
Big Bang de la ‘Transaction Pénale,’ LES ECHOS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.lesechos.fr/
economie-france/budget-fiscalite/021674189235-corruption-des-entreprises-le-big-bang-de-latransaction-penale-1197811.php.
2. See, e.g., Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Remarks at the American
Conference Institute’s 32nd Annual International Conference on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-rcaldwell-delivers-remarks-american-conference; see also Andrew Ceresney, Director,
Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Enforcement, Keynote Address at ACI’s
32nd FCPA Conference (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-fcpakeynote-11-17-15.html.
3. See UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 60 (2012) [hereinafter FCPA RESOURCES GUIDE] (“DOJ’s and
SEC’s FCPA enforcement actions demonstrate that third parties, including agents, consultants,
and distributors, are commonly used to conceal the payment of bribes to foreign officials in
international business transactions. Risk-based due diligence is particularly important with
third parties and will also be considered by DOJ and SEC in assessing the effectiveness of a
company’s compliance program.”).
4. See id. at 53.
5. Id.
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a result, once a company learns that FCPA violations may have been
committed by one of its agents or consultants, the company is under
pressure to immediately self-investigate and take internal corrective
measures.6
Taking such corrective measures will often mean imposing a
moratorium on payments to agents or business consultants suspected
of wrongdoing, until, at the very least, the agent or consultant has
agreed to cooperate in the FCPA investigation, including by agreeing
to be interviewed by the company’s outside counsel, and more likely,
until the suspicion that the underlying transaction was improper is
resolved.7 While some agents or consultants may indeed cooperate in
these efforts, others will not and will instead initiate legal proceedings
to get paid, most commonly, through initiating international
arbitrations outside the United States based on arbitration clauses that
are commonly contained in most consulting agreements. The
company is then placed in a difficult position: if it meets the
expectations of US regulators and halts all payments to its corrupt
contractor agent, the company exposes itself to an arbitration brought
6. For example, Siemens devoted over 1.5 million hours of billable time to its FCPA
investigation, which took place in thirty-four countries and involved over 1,750 interviews and
over 800 informational meetings. Dept. Of Justice Sentencing Memorandum, United States v.
Siemens AG et al., No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2008/12/19/siemens-sentencing-memo.pdf
(stating
what
Siemens’ attorneys spent); see also Press Release, Dept. Of Justice, Ralph Lauren Corporation
Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $882,000 Monetary
Penalty (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ralph-lauren-corporation-resolvesforeign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay (acknowledging in settlement
agreement Ralph Lauren’s “extensive, thorough, and timely cooperation, including selfdisclosure of the misconduct, voluntarily making employees available for interviews, [and]
making voluntary document disclosures”).
7. When Siemens pled guilty to FCPA allegations in 2008, it agreed to impose “a
moratorium on entering into new business consulting agreements or making payments under
existing business consulting agreements until a complete collection and review was undertaken
of all such agreements.” Dept. Of Justice Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Siemens
A.G., No. 1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008); see also Sally Quillian, Deputy Attorney
General, Dept. of Justice, Remarks at New York University School of Law Announcing New
Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing, (Sept. 10, 2015), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarksnew-york-university-school (“Effective today, if a company wants any consideration for its
cooperation, it must give up the individuals, no matter where they sit within the company. And
we’re not going to let corporations plead ignorance. If they don’t know who is responsible,
they will need to find out. If they want any cooperation credit, they will need to investigate and
identify the responsible parties, and then provide all non-privileged evidence implicating those
individuals.”).
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by the consultant or agent. On the other hand, if the company keeps
paying its corrupt agent, it exposes itself to further criminal liability in
the United States.8
This growing dilemma for companies subject to the FCPA has
raised a number of issues, including (1) what the burden of proof
should be in international arbitration proceedings involving claims of
corruption or bribery, (2) whether arbitrators should stay arbitrations
pending an ongoing FCPA investigation and (3) whether there is
anything companies can do to prepare for such arbitrations.
I. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS
One of the problems with corruption is that it is often very hard
to prove. FCPA investigations are often commenced on the basis of
circumstantial evidence or so-called “red flags,” indicating that
corruption may have occurred. In the United States, such
circumstantial evidence or red flags are sufficient grounds for halting
payments to an agent or consultant suspected of wrongdoing. In fact,
US regulators expect companies to take immediate remedial actions
when such circumstantial evidence comes to light.9
8. Two 2014 decisions from the Swiss Supreme Court are illustrative of this point: on
September 23, 2014, the Swiss Supreme Court dismissed a petition including a request to set
aside an arbitral award and a request for a revision of the arbitral award. Pursuant to the award,
the petitioner company was to pay a consultant US$115,000 in outstanding consultancy fees
for assistance in preparing a bid for a tender for the construction and renovation of power
plants. The company argued that it would likely face criminal sanctions if it were to comply
with the award due to ongoing criminal investigations brought under the UK Bribery Act and
the FCPA into potential corrupt acts engaged in by the consultant. In dismissing petitioner’s
request, the Supreme Court explained that the company’s argument at most indicated that the
company could be subject to criminal sanctions in the United Kingdom and the United States,
not that the validity of the contract between the consultant and the company was actually
affected by the alleged bribery. In addition, the Swiss Supreme Court also held that it had no
basis for modifying the outcome of the arbitration because the company had failed to prove
that bribery had actually occurred. Bundesgericht [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 23,
2014, 4A_231/2014 (Switz.); Bundesgericht [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 23, 2014,
4A_247/2014 (Switz.).
9. The DOJ and the SEC have repeatedly emphasized the importance for companies to
take immediate action when signs of corrupt acts surface. For example, in 2014, HewlettPackard paid US$108 million in fines after one of its subsidiaries was found to have paid
bribes through agents and various shell companies to procure business in Mexico and Eastern
Europe. In its press release, the SEC admonished Hewlett-Packard, stating that even though
employees within the subsidiary had raised questions about the significant markup being paid
to the agent and its subcontractors, the subsidiary had ignored these red flags and gone forward
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However, in arbitral proceedings, mere red flags or
circumstantial evidence are often not sufficient to establish a defense
of corruption for non-payment of fees to an agent or consultant. This
is because, in those types of cases, the laws of civil law countries
often govern the contracts, the seat of the arbitration is often outside
the United States, and a majority of the arbitrators in these arbitrations
are often from civil law jurisdictions. Under these circumstances, the
governing law will often require actual proof of corruption by clear
evidence.10 Tribunals may primarily expect the parties to submit
evidence in support of their claims or defenses with a limited
opportunity to seek document disclosure.11 Furthermore, in many civil
law jurisdictions, there is no culture of cooperation with law
enforcement investigations. It is up to prosecutors and investigating
magistrates to prove the existence of criminal conduct. These
international arbitrations often highlight cultural differences between
arbitrators. Depending on their legal culture and background, they
may have very different perspectives on the company’s and the
consultant’s duty to cooperate with law enforcement. They may view
the criminal investigation as either central or tangential to the
arbitration.
The high burden of proof coupled with the strictly limited ability
to obtain documents from the consultant will frequently make it
impossible to prove the existence of corruption. This is especially the
case because, in most instances, proof of the consultant’s activities
will reside with him, and he will have no incentive to voluntarily
disclose evidence of wrongful conduct.12 Accordingly, the company
with the deal. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard With FCPA Violations:
Company to Pay $108 Million to Settle Civil and Criminal Cases (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.
sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541453075.
10. Case No. 5622 of 1988, 19 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 105 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (providing
that allegations of corruption must be proven “beyond doubt”); Case No. 7047 of 1994, 21
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 79 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (finding that “[i]f the claimant’s claim based on the
contract is to be voided by the defence of bribery, the arbitral tribunal, as any state court, must
be convinced that there is indeed a case of bribery. A mere ‘suspicion’ by any member of the
arbitral tribunal . . . is entirely insufficient to form such a conviction of the Arbitral
Tribunal.”).
11. See Geoffrey C. Jr., Hazard, Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017 (1998).
12. In World Duty Free Company Limited v. the Republic of Kenya, one of the key
decisions to date in the investor-state arbitration context dealing with corruption, the tribunal
only had occasion to rule on the effects of corruption on the claims at issue because the
petitioning party itself revealed that it had made a US$2 million dollar personal donation to the
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may well have to pay the potentially corrupt agent or consultant’s fees
as well as arbitration costs, including a portion of the legal fees of the
consultant under the prevailing view in international arbitration that
costs follow the event.
In those types of cases, some arbitral tribunals have lowered the
standard of proof, allowed the introduction of circumstantial evidence
or reversed the burden of proof by requiring the agent or consultant to
disprove corruption once the company has set forth a prima facie case
of corruption.13 Other tribunals however have been hesitant to engage
in such burden-shifting.14 And some have found that there has to be a
high burden of proof for claims of bribery or corruption on the basis
that “fraud can never be taken lightly,”15 creating further uncertainty
Kenyan president. As a result, the tribunal did not have to consider the appropriate standard of
proof for proving corruption. World Duty Free Company Limited v. the Republic of Kenya,
ICSID Case No. Arb/00/7, Award (October 4, 2006).
13. See, e.g., Case No. 6497 of 1994, 24 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 71 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.)
(tribunal sitting in Switzerland applying Swiss law held that that even though the party
alleging bribery normally has the burden of proof, in some cases, tribunals may allow the party
alleging bribery “to bring some relevant evidence for its allegations,” and then the tribunal
may “exceptionally request the other party to bring some counterevidence, if such task is
possible and not too burdensome”); see also Case No. 12990 of 2005, 24 ICC ICArb. Bull. 52
(ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (allowing circumstantial evidence on the basis that unlawful nature of a
contract is difficult to prove) as reported in Christian Albanesi & Emmanuel Jolivet, Dealing
with Corruption in Arbitration: A Review of ICC Experience, 24 ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 27, 33 (2013).
14. See, e.g., Case No. 7047 of 1994, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 79 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.)
(stating “[i]f a claimant asserts claims arising from a contract, and the defendant objects that
the claimant’s rights arising from the contract are null due to bribery, it is up to the defendant
to present the fact of bribery and the pertaining evidence within the time limits allowed to him
for presenting facts.”); see also Case No. 5622 of 1988, 19 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 105 (ICC Int’l
Ct. Arb.) (holding that “bribery ha[d] not been proved doubt,” and even though circumstantial
evidence is allowed to prove facts in contention, there must be “something more than likely
facts”).
15. Case No. 6401 of 1992 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (unpublished) as reported in Albanesi
& Jolivet, supra note 13, at 32 (applying “preponderance of the evidence” standard to
substantive claims but holding that based on the laws of the United States and the Philippines,
the countries to which the dispute was connected, a higher standard had to be applied to the
allegations of corruption because “fraud in civil cases must be proven to exist by clear and
convincing evidence amounting to more than a mere preponderance, and cannot be justified by
a mere speculation”); see also EDF Services Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. Arb/05/13, ¶
221 (Oct. 8, 2009) (stating “corruption must be proven and is notoriously difficult to prove,
since, typically, there is little or no physical evidence. The seriousness of the accusation of
corruption in the present case, considering that it involves officials at the highest level of the
Romanian Government at the time, demands clear and convincing evidence. There is general
consensus among international tribunals and commentators regarding the need for a high
standard of proof of corruption.”).
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for those companies who are faced with defending FCPA proceedings
in the United States and arbitration proceedings elsewhere in the
world.
In light of the challenge of proving corruption, the arbitral award
in many cases will turn on whether the consultant satisfied its
contractual obligations, in particular the consultant’s obligation to
retain and submit proofs of his services, as well as the contractual
obligation to cooperate with audits and investigations. Reviewing
proofs of services makes it possible for tribunals to assess whether the
consultant performed actual services, or merely funneled payments to
foreign public officials (i.e., bribes) in exchange for confidential
information about the bids submitted by competitors.16 Many
consulting agreements contain language requiring consultants to
retain proofs of their activities, to submit these documents along with
their invoices, and to cooperate with audits. In some cases, these
terms are identified as “essential” or “material” in the contract itself.
In certain civil law jurisdictions, however, such contractual
obligations will be viewed as merely ancillary, not main obligations,
if the parties’ course of conduct demonstrates that compliance was not
essential in practice.17 Therefore, a tribunal may examine the parties’
course of conduct, beyond the four corners of the contracts, and,

16. See, e.g., Case No. 12990 of 2005, 24 ICC ICArb. Bull. 52 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.)
(holding that underlying purpose of agreement was unlawful where claimant was unable to
produce evidence that it had performed any of its obligations in relation to the agreements
between the parties); Case No. 13914 of 2008, 24 ICC ICArb. Bull. 77 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.)
(finding that there was “clear and convincing” evidence of bribery based on several red flags
raised by claimant’s actions, including his inability to disclose bank and tax records, and his
inability to prove the legitimacy of several wire transfers from his account to relatives of a
state official) as reported in Albanesi & Jolivet, supra note 13, at 32-34.
17. In construing contractual obligations, certain decisions of the Swiss Tribunal
Federal have focused on whether a contractual obligation was a “main” or “ancillary”
obligation. Bundesgericht [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 15, 2000, 4C.105/2000, 12,
79 (Switz.). Other decisions have focused on the subjective and objective intent of the parties.
SI X. SA c. A., Tribunal Federal 4A 379/2011 (December 2, 2011). The Swiss Tribunal
Federal has held that the “apparently clear meaning of the terms is not necessarily
determinative, such that a purely literal interpretation is precluded. Even if a contractual term
appears to be crystal clear at first sight, it might not precisely convey the meaning of the
agreement, depending on other contract terms, the goal pursued by the parties, or other
circumstances. It is not appropriate, however, to depart from the literal words adopted by the
parties when there is no serious reason to believe that such literal meaning did not actually
convey their intent.” Id. at 5.

836

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:829

depending on the parties’ course of conduct, they may excuse the
consultant’s failure to comply with these obligations.18
II. STAYING ARBITRATION PENDING COMPLETION OF
FCPA INVESTIGATION
In 2007, an arbitral tribunal awarded Siemens A.G. (“Siemens”)
US$217 million in an ICSID arbitration Siemens brought against
Argentina. One year later, Siemens pleaded guilty to FCPA violations
in connection with the Argentine contract, paying US$1.6 billion to
regulators in the United States and in Germany. Subsequently,
Siemens waived the arbitral award against Argentina.19 The Siemens
arbitration raises the question of whether arbitral tribunals should
consider staying arbitration proceedings if there is a parallel criminal
investigation ongoing in the respondent’s home country. This would
prevent situations in which arbitral awards are later called into
question on the basis that they rewarded a corrupt party. In addition, a
stay would also allow for a fuller development of the facts to meet the
greater goal of deterring bribery and corruption, especially since
tribunals will often not themselves engage in a deep factual
investigation into the consultant’s potentially corrupt practices.
That said, a goal of arbitration is efficiency, and tribunals are
increasingly focused on resolving disputes without undue delays.20
18. ICC arbitrations have considered course of performance in a variety of contexts.
See, e.g., Case No. 8362 of 1995, 22 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 164 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (assessing
whether claimant’s course of performance amounted to consent to termination of claimant’s
distribution agreement with respondent); Case No. 6527 of 1991, 18 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 44
(ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (“The attention is therefore to be concentrated on the actions performed
and the behaviour adopted by the parties, in order to establish whether the defendant’s
withdrawal from the [c]ontract was justified under the circumstances.”); see also Joshua
Karton, The Arbitral Role in Contractual Interpretation, 6 J. OF INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1, 4–
41 (2015). In its FCPA Resource Guide, the DOJ also recommends that companies
periodically update and review its third-party relationships, including exercising audit rights,
providing annual training and requesting annual compliance certification. See FCPA
RESOURCES GUIDE, supra note 3, at 60.
19. Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, award, (Jan.
17, 2007); see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Seven Former Siemens Executives with
Bribing Leaders in Argentina (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011263.htm (discussing Siemens waiver of its arbitral award).
20. ICC Rule 30(1) provides, unless the ICC Court sets a different deadline, “[t]he time
limit within which the arbitral tribunal must render its final award is six months.” The ICDR
International Dispute Resolution Procedures also emphasizes the need to promptly resolve
disputes. Under article 15.8 of the CPR International Administered Arbitration Rules, “[t]he
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Illustrative of this point, in a 2012 arbitration brought in Switzerland
under Swiss law by a consultant for payment of outstanding fees, the
respondent company sought a stay of arbitration proceedings on the
basis that it would expose itself to criminal liability under the FCPA
and the UK Bribery Act because criminal investigations had been
initiated by the DOJ and the UK Serious Fraud Office concerning
potential corrupt projects in which the consultant had participated.21
The tribunal refused to issue a stay of proceedings, emphasizing that
the DOJ had not indicated a likely timeframe for the completion of
the investigation, and that the consultant’s interest in obtaining an
award outweighed the company’s interest in suspending its
contractual obligations until the termination of an investigation with
an unknown date of completion.22 Similarly, arbitrators might also
seek to keep the criminal investigation separate and independent from
the arbitral proceedings.23 As a result, stays continue to be a rare,
extraordinary measure in arbitration proceedings, even where
allegations of corruption or bribery have already surfaced.
That is particularly true because the rule in many civil law
countries that civil proceedings are stayed pending the resolution of
related criminal matters is generally not applicable in international
arbitration proceedings.24 In France, that rule is embodied in Article 4

final award should in most circumstances be rendered within 12 months of the constitution of
the Tribunal.”
21. See arbitral decision cited in Swiss Supreme Court Case Nos. 4A_231/2014 and
4A_247/2014, supra note 8.
22. Id.; see also Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 47 (July 19, 2007) (denying request by respondent to stay arbitral
proceedings pending outcome of German court proceedings involving documents seized by
German prosecutors in connection with investigation into corrupt acts committed by claimant
given that it was unknown when the German court would come to a decision regarding
whether respondent could get access to the documents).
23. See Yasmine Lahlou & Marina Matousekova, The Role of the Arbitrator in
Combatting Corruption, INT'L BUS. L. J. 6, 624 (2012) (“Unlike domestic judges, arbitrators do
not carry out the public service of justice on behalf of a State. They are not bound by domestic
rules of law, including criminal law against corruption. An international arbitrator is not the
guardian of the public interest promoted by the criminal statutes of each State connected with
the dispute, irrespective of the imperative nature of those laws domestically.”).
24. Id. at 625.
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of the French Code of Criminal Procedure.25 That rule, however, does
not apply to parallel arbitration proceedings.26
CONCLUSION
To prevent corruption from occurring in the first instance,
companies should place an emphasis on conducting due diligence on
third-party consultants and agents prior to engagement to prevent
FCPA or UK Bribery Act violations from occurring in the first
place.27 Companies should of course build anti-corruption protections
into their agreements with such consultants and agents by including
provisions that, for example, contractually require consultants and
agents to provide periodic representations that they are in compliance
with anti-corruption laws, retain records, provide meaningful proofs
of services, and personally cooperate with audits and investigations as
material conditions precedent to receiving payments, as well as
payment suspension and contract termination provisions tied to
compliance. In light of the different rules of contract interpretation,
companies also should make sure that these contract terms are
respected and actually enforced as part of the ordinary course of the
parties’ performance of their obligations.

25. CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN] art. 4, (Fr). Article 4 of the French
Code of Criminal Procedure states that, when criminal proceedings are initiated, related civil
proceedings are stayed and, in particular, no civil judgment may be issued.
26. See Lahlou & Matousekova, supra note 23, at n.18.
27. See FCPA RESOURCES GUIDE, supra note 3, at 60.

